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ABSTRACT 
The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror and 
continues to struggle with irregular war.  As the Department of Defense’s lead for 
Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command co-authored the Irregular 
Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 with the U.S. Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command in order to “outline a holistic U.S. Government and 
partner nation approach to IW.”   The concept establishes the need to integrate all 
instruments of national power in order to enable a joint force commander to successfully 
conduct a protracted IW campaign against state and non-state actors. The end state is a 
joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting.  To 
succeed in IW the commander and staff need a campaign planning system that answers 
two primary questions: “How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing 
populations?” and, “How do you measure your efforts in IW?”  The answer may be a 
“marriage” of an effects-based thinking with the concepts outlined in the new IW JOC.  
This thesis will analyze the potential of such a concept, utilizing a case study of Special 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) and continues to struggle with understanding both “how to win,” and “if it is 
winning” an irregular1 warfare engagement.  As the Department of Defense’s (DoD) lead 
for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) co-authored 
the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 with the U.S. 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to “outline a holistic U.S. 
Government (USG) and partner nation approach to IW.”2   The concept establishes the 
need to integrate all instruments of national power (diplomatic, intelligence, military, and 
economic)3 in order to enable a joint force commander (JFC) to successfully conduct a 
protracted4 IW campaign against state and non-state actors. “The overall desired end state 
is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting 
that allows the joint force to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.”5  
However, the current joint command and staff construct for planning and executing 
conventional warfare does not suit the IW JOC.  To succeed in IW the joint command 
and staff needs a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: “How 
do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?” and, “How do you 
measure your efforts in IW?”  The answer is a “marriage” of an effects-based approach to 
operations with the concepts outlined in the new IW JOC.  
                                                 
1 Department of Defense (DoD), Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0. 
(Washington D.C., 11 September 2007), B-3. NOTE: This thesis will use the  IW JOC’s proposed 
definition of “irregular” – “activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which significant 
numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary 
operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of 
any country.”  
2 Ibid., 1.  
3 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms (Washington D.C., 12 
April 2001, as amended 14 September 2007), 266.  NOTE: This thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of 
“instruments of national power” – “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national 
objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.” 
4  DoD, IW JOC, 5. NOTE: This thesis will use the IW JOC’s definition of “protracted” – “an 
operation, campaign, or war of such long duration that it requires multiple unit rotations for an indefinite 
period of time. 
5 Ibid. 
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This thesis analyzes the potential application of an effects-based approach to IW 
operations serving as a review of the concepts and critiques of effects-based operations 
(EBO), and EBO’s evolution to an effects-based approach (EBA).  Concepts of irregular 
warfare, IW’s present evolution in the IW JOC, and IW’s relationship to effects-based 
thinking are analyzed.  This approach provides a framework for understanding why 
conventional warfare has survived the past century without an effects-based approach, 
and why IW cannot survive the future without adopting an effects-based approach.  
Utilizing the Special Operations Command Pacific’s (SOCPAC) use of an effects-based 
approach to the War on Terror (WOT) as a comparative case study, this thesis 
investigates the development, application, and compatibility of an effects-based approach 
with SOCPAC’s conduct of IW in the Pacific theater.  In doing so, potential benefits and 
shortcomings are identified. Lastly, this thesis analyzes those benefits and shortfalls in 
implementing an effects-based approach to IW and provides recommendations for the 
broader application of an effects-based approach to the IW JOC. 
The IW JOC states, “The future security environment includes a mix of military 
and non-military challenges by state and non-state actors to U.S. national security, with 
IW as the favored form of warfare of those who would be our adversaries.”6 An effects-
based approach allowed the SOCPAC commander and his staff to focus efforts and 
measure success in this new irregular environment.  When used properly an effects-based 
approach is a tool that enables the commander to score his return on investment, and not 
simply count the number of activities executed in theater.  This allows future joint force 
commanders to prioritize resources while measuring USG and partner nation 
effectiveness in achieving operational and strategic GWOT objectives.7 
The U.S. military faces the challenges of continuing the GWOT into the next 
decade.  In order to be successful it must adapt its methodology of targeting friendly and 
enemy systems in a protracted irregular campaign.  The use of an effects-based approach 
merged with the concepts of the new Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept 
                                                 
6 DoD, IW JOC, 11. 
7 David P. Fridovich & Fred T. Krawchuck, “Winning in the Pacific, The Special Operations Forces 
Indirect Approach,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007) 27. 
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achieves this.  The challenge is the adaptation of a military process that is currently 
compatible in conventional warfare. The U.S. military doctrine writers will have to shift 
their efforts towards a better understanding of irregular warfare. The publishing of the IW 
JOC is only the first step.  The next step is combining a practical staff methodology for 
fighting a more irregular threat. The SOCPAC model provides a concept for 
consideration.  By using an effects-based approach to planning and executing an IW 
campaign, the future joint force commanders will have the necessary framework to 
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II. EFFECTS-BASED THINKING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of effects-based operations (EBO) is nothing new. Throughout 
military history the notion of understanding an adversary and exploiting his weakness has 
always been the foundation of a sound military strategy.  The ability of the military 
commander to identify his target, execute his operation, and assess his actions constituted 
his own “strategic intuition.”  Military theorist Karl von Clausewitz understood and wrote 
of the importance of a commander’s intuition.  In the military classic On War, Clausewitz 
explains the military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte.  He attributes Napoleon’s success to 
his ability to make flash judgments and cut through the “fog of war.”8  Clausewitz refers 
to the French phrase “coup d’oeil,” or “to glance.”9  For Clausewitz, coup d’oeil was “the 
rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only 
becomes so after long examination and reflection.”10  What Clausewitz describes as a 
“rapid discovery of truth” is what made Napoleon a great military commander and leader 
of the French Empire.  It not only allowed Napoleon to strike decisively at his 
adversary’s weakest points, but allowed him the foresight to see beyond the battlefield 
and into the political, economic, and social arenas.  This left Napoleon with an informal 
methodology that provided him with the best course of action (COA) to achieve his 
national objectives.  
The Eastern military philosopher Sun Tzu also wrote of the concepts behind EBO.  
He articulated a distinct understanding of the links between military might and diplomatic 
objectives.  In the Art of War, he states, “Seek to take an enemy’s country intact rather 
than destroy it.  Seek to capture an enemy’s armies rather than destroy them.  To fight 
and conquer is not excellent strategy.  Excellent strategy is to achieve victory without 
                                                 
8 William Duggan, Coup D’oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning, Monograph online. (Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005); available from 




violence.”11   The second and third order effects of eliminating a conquered foe’s male 
population create an obvious economic burden in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
Sun Tzu understood the importance of influencing the population as well as targeting an 
adversary’s military weaknesses.  Today these concepts are no different.  However, the 
evolution of warfare and the growing separation between the instruments of national 
power have eliminated this sort of strategic intuition, leaving a gap in current military 
operations.  An effects-based approach to operations attempts to fill this gap for the 
modern joint force commander. 
B. CONTEMPORARY GENESIS OF EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS 
The term “effects-based operation” was first used by the USAF Center for 
Campaign Planning (affectionately named the “Black Hole”) during the first night of 
OPERATION Desert Storm.12  The “Black Hole” planners focused not only on the 
execution of the target list, rather they hoped to predict the second and third order effects 
beyond simple target destruction.  This methodology pulled from a history of predicting 
second and third order effects used in air power thinking by the U.S. Army’s Air Corp’s 
Tactical School before World War II.  This thought process was later revived as the 
primary approach to air campaign planning during the Cold War.13  The result was a 
systems analysis to target planning, and it resulted in the destruction of Iraq’s integrated 
air defense system in the first few hours of the Gulf War.14 
The modern concept of effects-based operations was refined in the early 1990s by 
US Air Force Colonel John Warden.  Col Warden laid the intellectual foundation for 
                                                 
11 William Lidwell, trans. and ed., The Art of War, by Sun Tzu (WOWIO Books, 2006) 
http://www.wowio.com/users/product.asp?BookId=11, (accessed 3 July 2007), 36. 
12 Williamson Murray, “Transformation: Volume II,” in Transformation Concepts for National 
Security in the 21st Century, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 
2002), 3. 
13 Murray, 3-4. 
14 Ibid. 
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EBO with his depiction of the enemy as a system15 and future war as “parallel 
warfare.”16  “Parallel Warfare” is defined by the principles of both annihilation and 
attrition happening simultaneously rather than sequentially.  USAF Brigadier General 
David A. Deptula asserts in his monograph, Effects Based Operations: Change in the 
Nature of Warfare, that the Gulf War demonstrated the application of “parallel warfare” 
allowing control of enemy forces without the requirement for massing surface forces.17 
Col Warder “argued that technology would allow the United States to attack multiple, 
vital targets simultaneously at the strategic level, and thus collapse an adversary’s system, 
leaving him with no means to respond.”18 He stated that this “makes very real what 
Clausewitz called the ideal form of war.”19  By identifying the key interconnecting nodes 
in an adversary's systems, one could effectively target multiple systems with a single 
shot. 
Despite the apparent success of the Gulf War air campaign, EBO remained USAF 
centric until 2000 when the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) began to explore a 
broader application of the concept.  USJFCOM focused on expanding the concept beyond 
a tool for analyzing second and third order effects of strategic bombing campaigns.  The 
USAF found EBO to be a very useful staff thinking tool when it came to the integration 
of stealth and precision weaponry.  USJFCOM sought to expand EBO’s potential by 
applying it to the challenge of integrating the instruments of national power for strategic 
campaign planning.  USJFCOM hoped to broaden the systems based approach in order to 
potentially analyze the effects needed to achieve a strategic objective that included the 
linkage of military power to another instrument of national power.  A systems based 
approach would account for the links or nodes between the political, military, economic, 
                                                 
15 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms, 527. NOTE: this 
thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “system” – “A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related 
group of regularly interacting or interdependent instruments; that group of instruments forming a unified 
whole.” 
16 Gary H. Cheek, “Effects-Based Operations: The End of Dominant Maneuver?” in Transformation 
Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, September 2002), 74-75.  




social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) networks that comprise the nation-state 
system.  This systems based approach potentially offered the best way to achieve those 
strategic objectives assigned a USJFCOM by the Department of Defense (DoD).  
USJFCOM understood EBO as an analytical form of warfare.  It allowed for the 
anticipation of enemy actions and reactions, and then executed tasks, assessed effects, 
and reassigned or re-executed tasks again based on the measurement of effects.20 
The events of 9/11 ushered in a new threat to U.S. national security and global 
stability.   With this new threat came the need for the U.S. military to identify a new way 
to fight an irregular adversary.  USJFCOM seized on this new requirement to adapt EBO 
to planning and executing operations against this threat.  From the end of 2001 to early 
2004, USJFCOM refined the effect-based operations process and in November of 2004 
published the Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 7, Implications of Effects-based 
Operations (EBO) to explain the process and joint application.  USJFCOM also identified 
potential doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities 
(DOTMLPF) requirements for the execution of EBO.  Next, USJFCOM’s Doctrine 
Integration Branch hosted a two-day conference from 31 January to 1 February 2005.21  
The conference established a common understanding of EBO.  The consensus of the 
conference members not to adopt EBO as a fundamentally new method of warfighting, 
rather the members believed doctrine should codify the effects-based approach (EBA) as 
fundamental to operational art and design.22 
C. MOVING TOWARD AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH 
In 2005, USJFCOM shifted away from the effects-based operations (EBO) as “the 
way to conduct operations”, and instead focused on the practical application of an effects-
                                                 
20 Cheek, 92. 
21 Joint Warfighting Center, “A Common Perspective,” U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting 
Center Doctrine and Education Group’s Newsletter, Vol 13, No. 1, (May 2005); available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/acp13_1.pdf; Internet; accessed 01 Jun 2007. 
22 Ibid. 
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based approach (EBA) as “a way of conducting operations.”23  EBA is not defined in and 
of itself.  Rather, USJFCOM focused on the joint force commander’s understanding of 
the adversary, the operational environment (OE), and the best way to employ the 
instruments of national power.24   
An effects-based approach views the OE through a systems perspective with the 
objective of focusing the staff on the relevant links and nodes.  The PMESII networks 
comprise the OE at the nation-state level.  Each network or system is interconnected via 
nodes25 (person, place, or thing) and links (behavioral, physical, or functional 
relationships).26  Some nodes are identified as potential “key nodes.”  “These are nodes 
related to a strategic or operational effect or center of gravity (COG).”27 Key nodes are 
likely to be linked to, or identified in, multiple systems.  Since each adversary’s OE is 
composed of systems, nodes, and links, the capabilities of the U.S. instruments of power 
can be focused against selected key nodes to attain operational and strategic effects.28  
The result is a staff thinking process or system that analyzes the independent systems and 
corresponding links and nodes of an adversary’s OE.  This is labeled a “system of 
systems analysis” (SoSA) and it gives the joint force commander (JFC) and his staff a 
holistic understanding of the OE and the required conditions to achieve assigned 
operational and strategic objectives.29   Each of those operational and strategic objectives 
is then further divided into the tasks needed to achieve the desired effects.30  Each effect 
                                                 
23 Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-
Based Approach to Joint Operations (Suffolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 24 
February 2006), i. 
24 Ibid., I-6. 
25 Joint Publication 1-02, 375. NOTE this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “node” – “3. An 
element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing.” 
26 Joint Warfighting Center, 1-3. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., II-1. 
30 Joint Publication 1-02, 176. NOTE this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “effect” – “1. The 
physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.  2.  
The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of 
freedom.” 
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provides the link between national strategic objectives and tactical actions.31  The result 
is a “systems perceptive” of the OE (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1.   Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment32 
 
Each instrument of national power can achieve different effects, and those effects 
can be achieved directly or indirectly.  Some effects are created as a result of direct 
actions against nodes, while other effects are achieved by the indirect effect on other 
interconnected nodes linked to the primary targeted node.33  These effects are then 
assigned to subordinate and supporting command echelons as objectives and tasks with 
the effect as the link between the two (Figure 2). 
                                                 
31 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations, I-1. 
32 Ibid., II-2. 
33 Ibid., II-11. 
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Figure 2.   Effects and Command Echelons34 
 
This echelon approach of linking objective to effects and tasks helps to create a 
depth and breadth throughout the OE.  As Figure 3 indicates the actions against nodes at 
the tactical and operational levels can affect nodes, links, and systems at the strategic 
level, and vice versa.  The “benefit of graphically portraying these node-link relationships 
(in as much detail as time permits) is that the potential impact of actions against certain 
nodes can become more evident.”35  This graphic representation also exposes the number 
and strength of links to a node or nodes, which indicate potential COGs. 
                                                 
34 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations, I-5. 
35 Ibid., II-4. 
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Figure 3.   The Breadth and Depth of a Systems Perspective. 
 
D.   THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK FOR AN EFFECTS-BASED 
APPROACH TO JOINT OPERATIONS 
USJFCOM outlined this new way of thinking in the Commander’s Handbook for 
an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, published by the Joint Warfighting 
Center (JWFC) in February 2006.  The systems analysis process is the foundation of an 
effects-based approach to operations and provides the joint community with a common 




joint doctrine.36  The handbook outlines how an effects-based approach can be applied at 
the theater strategic and operational levels, specifically during the planning, execution, 
and assessment of an operation.37 
1. Planning 
“Planning for the employment of military forces occurs at every echelon of 
command and across the range of military operations.  An effects-based approach to 
planning complements the traditional planning process.”38  The current joint operations 
planning blend the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and the process of 
operational design.  The JOPP is a methodical process that is initiated by the receipt of a 
mission and the joint force commander’s guidance and then proceeds through mission 
analysis, COA determination, ending with joint orders production (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4.   The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)39 
                                                 
36 Joint Warfighting Center, “An Effects-Based Approach, Refining How We Think About Joint 
Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007), 2. 
37 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations, i. 
38 Joint Warfighting Center, “An Effects-Based Approach, Refining How We Think About Joint 
Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 3. 
39 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations, III-2. 
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The current JOPP does not force the commander or staff to think in terms of 
effects or a systems perspective.  Designated COAs and corresponding tasks may or may 
not match desired or achievable effects, nor does the JOPP seek to promote “unified 
action”40 with interagency partners and/or partner nations.  An effects-based approach is 
cyclic in nature and allows the staff to assess its progress and refocus effort as part of the 
normal JOPP process through integration in the mission analysis and COA determination 
cycles.    
“The mission analysis process is iterative and collaborative, but not always 
sequential. It is, however, always centered on and driven by the JFC's and staff's systems 
perspective: data, information, knowledge, and understanding of the OE in which the 
friendly and adversary systems interact.” 41 Figure 5 (EBA and the JOPP Mission 
Analysis Process) depicts how an effects-based approach is integrated in the staff mission 
analysis process.  This combined process enables the commander and staff to determine 
the effects that will “bridge the gap” between objective and task.  The effects allow the 
staff to describe the conditions needed to be established or avoided within the OE to 
achieve the commander’s end state.42  As Figure 5 depicts the two additions to the 
mission analysis process are; (1) “define the operational environment as a system of 
systems,” and (2) “identify effects/measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and potential 
COGs.”  Upon completion of mission analysis the staff integrates a continued effects-
based approach into the traditional JOPP COA determination cycle as depicted in Figure 
6.  As Figure 6 depicts there are six additions to the COA determination process and they 
are; (1) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) portray the OE as systems, 
nodes, and links, (2) identify critical capacity (CCs), critical requirements (CRs), critical 
vulnerabilities (CVs), and key nodes, (3) couple friendly desired effects and COAs, (4) 
                                                 
40 Joint Publication 1-02, 565. NOTE this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “unified action” – 
“The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and 
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” 
41 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations,. III-3.  
42 Ibid., III-5. 
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couple enemy desired effects and COAs, (5) compare friendly and adversary attainment 
of desired effects, and (6) determine friendly COA risks of undesired effects. 
 
Figure 5.   EBA and the JOPP Mission Analysis Process43 
 
Figure 6.   EBA and the JOPP Course of Action Determination Process44 
                                                 





Once each COA is wargamed and vetted it is analyzed, compared, and validated 
prior to recommendation to the JFC.  The result is the selection of a COA that is more 
readily adaptable during execution.  “In planning, the commander’s intent and early 
identification of desired effects steer both the mission and analysis and COA 
determination process.”45  The integration of an effects-based approach to the JOPP 
enhances the probability of objective to task translation and success.  
2. Execution 
"Execution can be best characterized as monitoring, assessing, planning, and 
directing actions in the battlespace to create desired effects.  Like planning, execution is a 
cyclical, iterative and multi-echelon collaborative process" (see Figure 7, Execution).46 
 
 
Figure 7.   Execution of an Effects-Based Approach. 
The execution process puts into action the JFC’s plan to integrate DIME to create 
his desired effects.47  By incorporating a cyclic tasking and re-tasking process the 
                                                 
45 Ibid., III-23. 
46 Ibid., IV-1. 
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commander and his staff can monitor, assess, plan, and direct the necessary actions 
needed to achieve desired tactical effects, while creating desired effects and preventing 
undesired effects in achieving operational and strategic objectives.48 
3. Assessment 
Assessment measures the effectiveness of joint planning and execution.  
Assessment is the primary tool that the JFC has to determine his commands and 
subordinates progress toward "accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an 
objective."49   Once effects are assigned, the staff then determines those indicators 
(effects measures) that show if the desired system behaviors are achieved.   These 
indicators then become part of the commander’s critical information requirements 
(CCIR).50  The process helps the JFC to identify any gaps in task accomplishment and 
effects achieved at each echelon.  The assessment seeks to identify the "delta" with in the 
OE and then refine planning and execution to "bridge the gap."51  This is vital in an 
irregular warfare environment where battle damage-assessment (BDA) cannot be 
measured by vehicles destroyed or territory gained.  It requires a more holistic assessment 
of all instruments of DIME, often with greater assessment of the non-military aspects of 
the OE. 
E. CRITICISM OF USJFCOM’S EFFECTS BASED APPROACH 
USJFCOM first suggested the benefits of an EBO concept in 2001 to then 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  EBO was pitched to Secretary Rumsfeld, as “a 
continuously updated operational support tool that provides a JTF commander visibility 
of effects-to-task linkages based on a ‘system-of-systems’ analysis of a potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations, IV-1. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., IV-6. 
50 Ibid., III-3. 
51 Ibid., IV-7. 
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adversary’s PMESII war-making capabilities.” 52  Secretary Rumsfeld liked the idea that 
through the use of evolving computer technology and analysis of intelligence and open 
source data, his commander’s could know almost everything about potential adversary’s 
capabilities, potential actions and reactions, and take the most cost effective means to 
victory.53  Secretary Rumsfeld sought immediate implementation and validation of the 
concept.54 
In the second half of 2002, USJFCOM conducted Millennium Challenge 2002.  
Millennium Challenge 2002 was an elaborate war game designed to validate emerging 
transformation concepts within the DoD.  The theories of EBO were put to practice 
against a rouge military commander in a fictitious Persian Gulf nation-state.55  Retired 
USMC LtGen Paul Van Riper, a known opponent of the DoD’s transformation strategy, 
was called to command the enemy forces.  Van Riper subverted the war game early by 
“going off script” and launching a pre-emptive missile strike on the U.S. Fleet in the 
Persian Gulf.  Despite the script’s call for Van Riper to piece meal his missile forces, he 
launched the bulk of everything he had at the fleet and overwhelmed the Aegis defense 
systems.  This attack resulted in 16 ships destroyed and over 20,000 dead sailors and 
marines.  The wargame was over before it could start.  The blue force’s effects-based 
planners’ assertions that such a missile attack was completely improbable had been 
disproved by Van Riper’s actions.  However, the game was reset and this time Van Riper 
was told to keep to the script.  Van Riper resigned as enemy commander and this time 
USJFCOM won.56 
What LtGen(R) Van Riper had hoped to point out (and later would reiterate in an 
email to GEN Peter Pace, in December of 2005) is that effects-based operations take 
away from and degrade the tradition and value of a commander’s intuitive decision 
                                                 
52 Andrew Cockburn, “How Rumsfeld was Suckered by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’” 
Counterpunch, 19 May 2007 [newsletter online]; available from 






making process.  Van Riper is not the first to point out that an all encompassing 
operational net assessment (ONA) driven by computer analysis software cannot account 
for all contingencies or eliminate the “fog of war.”  His actions during the Millennium 
wargame directly challenge that assertion.  However, by deviating from the script he 
knew before hand that he could undermine a system that played to a rationally acting 
adversary.   
Other opponents of effects-based thinking argue that it works contrary to the 
proven strategy of attrition warfare.  The concept is that “attrition warfare leads to the 
assured destruction of enemy military forces in the field, while effects-based operations, 
by bypassing certain enemy forces, can permit those forces to blend back into the 
population at large and prepare for a post-war insurgency campaign that U.S. forces 
might find more difficult and costly to counter.”57  Van Riper and other opponents of an 
effects-based approach base their analysis on a revisionist view of the early events of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  They actually criticize the efficiency of the process.  They 
argue that EBA can quickly bring about the collapse of an enemy government, with so 
little effect on the population, that is will only embolden an “undefeated” population to 
more willingly support the deposed regime or other insurgent activities.58  If this is the 
case, then it begs the question, “Why an effects-based approach to irregular warfare, if it 
is EBA that causes it in the first place?” 
F. AN EFFECTS BASED APPROACH FOR IW 
An effects-based approach system perspective shows promise when applied to 
IW.  It is EBA’s system analysis tools that allow the commander and staff to consider a 
full spectrum of actions, integration of whole-of-nation concept of power, recognition of 
interconnected actors, and measurement of effort that makes it a very adaptable staff 
                                                 
57 Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Transformation:  Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” CRS 
Report for Congress, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 9 
November 2006), 27. 
58 Ibid. 
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process.59  DoD must find a better way to leverage its forces and the other instruments of 
national power in the conduct of IW.  The central tenet of EBA is that it can purposefully 
shape the interactions of the actors in a complex security environment.60  It can also be 
predictive when used to plan a full spectrum campaign, from conventional to IW, thus 
allowing the commander and staff to better prepare for an “undefeated” population. 
While an effects-based approach can focus on utilizing all instruments of national 
power to kill or capture terrorists, deny safe haven, and cut off sources of support, it 
attempts to synchronize the efforts of the other instruments of national power besides the 
military.  Military operations cannot achieve success unilaterally, nor are they isolated to 
only having an effect on the belligerent’s military, especially when the opponent does not 
have a formal military force structure.  An effects-based approach provides the most 
effective way to focus, plan, and synchronize efforts in an irregular approach to the 
GWOT by focusing the other instruments of national power and integrate those into a 
harmonized effort. 
                                                 
59 Edward A. Smith, Complexity, Networking, & Effects-Based Approaches to Operations, 
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, July 2006), ix. 
60 Smith, x. 
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III. IRREGULAR WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The events following the end of the Cold War and more specifically the terrorist 
attacks of “9/11”61 ushered in a new era of understanding and efforts to define irregular 
warfare.  The U.S. military operations in the last six years have set a backdrop for the 
emergence of a renewed interest in the theory and practice of irregular warfare (IW).  
Like USJFCOM’s efforts to develop a new approach with effects-based operations, 
USSOCOM found itself tasked with redefining the U.S. Department of Defense 
understanding of IW.  The U.S. military’s growing strategic level security interest within 
failing and/or failed states took center stage in the violent struggle for legitimacy among 
state and non-state actors.  Revolutionary or insurgent violence, criminal activities, and 
terrorism that occur within “traditional” inter-state boundaries are nothing new.  
However, the challenge is to understand first, “How will current and future adversaries of 
the USG use these activities to undermine and erode the will and influence of the U.S. 
and our strategic partners?” and then “How will the USG achieve the level of unified 
action necessary to integrate all available instruments of national power to address 
irregular threats?”62  
B. THE U.S. IRREGULAR WARFARE FOCUS POST WORLD WAR II 
The concept of Irregular Warfare (IW) is arguably in its third round of policy, 
doctrinal, and academic engagement in the post World War II (WW II) era. 63  IW theory 
was first codified in the 1950s and 1960s in terms of the “small wars” and internal 
conflicts centered on Southeast Asia and Latin America.  Early U.S. military IW doctrine 
                                                 
61 NOTE:  For this thesis “9/11” will be defined as the terrorist attacks executed by the Al Qaeda 
Network (AQN) against the United States on 11 September 2001. 
62 Department of Defense (DoD), Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0. 
(Washington D.C., 11 September 2007), B-3. 
63 Mark T. Berger, Kenneth Burgess, James Mauldin and Michael P. Sullivan, “’Déjà Vu All Over 
Again’: Counterinsurgency and the ‘American Way of War’” Intelligence and National Security: An Inter-
Disciplinary Journal vol, 22. no, 4. (forthcoming).  
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at the time of the Vietnam War was limited.  The primary USMC doctrine found in the 
Small Wars Manual, first produced in 1940, was based primarily upon pre-WWII USMC 
operations in the Latin America “Banana Wars”.64 At the same time, the U.S. Army had 
produced a number of brief Field Manuals that regarded IW as primarily the purview of 
the U.S. Army Special Forces.65   
The second iteration of academic debate appeared to reach its height in the 
1980s.66  The post-Vietnam literature focused on resolving the U.S. military failures 
outside of a conventional warfare construct.  Despite this and the ongoing protracted 
irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and El Salvador, the U.S. military produced nothing 
new in the way of formal IW doctrine during this period.  Rather, the U.S. military 
shifted Cold War efforts to maximizing conventional warfare models.  This was the 
antithesis of IW.  “It reflected the U.S. military’s commitment to avoiding another 
Vietnam and only engaging in more or less conventional warfare with clearly defined 
objectives. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm—the First Gulf War—
were classic examples of this approach.” 67    
The final and current wave of IW theory revolves around the post-Cold War and 
the current conflicts that followed the attacks of 9/11.  “Of particular importance, 
however, [is] the growing awareness by 2004 that post-OEF and post-OIF stabilization 
and/or nation-building efforts [are] in trouble.”68  Many still believed IW to be the 
                                                 
64 United States Marine Corps (Department of the Navy), Small Wars Manual (NAVMC 2890), 
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940). 
65 See Department of the Army, Operations Against Guerilla Forces, FM 31-20 (February 1951). 
Department of the Army, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, FM 31-21 (October 1951); 
Department of the Army, Guerrilla Warfare, FM 31-21 (March 1955); Department of the Army, 
Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 31-16 (February 1963). 
66 See Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the 
Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of 
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 
1986); Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986); D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988); Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin 
America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992). 
67 Mark T. Berger et. Al. 
68 Ibid. 
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purview of special operations.  The U.S. military as a whole did not become interested in 
IW until after the end of major combat operations (MCO) in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
and the declaration of a “win” by President George W. Bush.  The focus within the DoD 
became a push to meet the challenges of combating the current and future adversaries that 
pursue “irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic” capabilities to threaten U.S. 
interests.69 
In October 2004 the U.S. Army and USMC co-produced an “interim” field 
manual on counterinsurgency (COIN).  This displayed an effort by the U.S. military to 
come to grips with COIN, which is one of the range of activities conducted as part of 
IW.70  Next, the DoD published its 2005 National Defense Strategy and in it stated: 
Increasingly sophisticated irregular methods – e.g., terrorism and 
insurgency – challenge U.S. security interests.  Adversaries employing 
opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose 
prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United 
States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action. ... 
Our experiences in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our 
military forces contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.71 
These sentiments were further amplified by the release of the DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report (QDR).  According to the Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon R. 
England, the 2006 QDR represented a “shift in the strategic direction of the U.S. armed 
forces to help the United States win the long war against terrorism.”72 The 2006 QDR 
laid out a “roadmap” for the development of Irregular Warfare capabilities, and 
emphasized the need to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges in order to effectively 
                                                 
69 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America 
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005), 2. 
70 Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker,, “For the First Time Since Vietnam, The Army Prints a Guide to 
Fighting Insurgents,” The New York Times, 13 November 2004 [online]; available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/13/politics/13army.html; Internet; accessed 31 October 2007. 
71 DoD, The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, 3. 
72 Steven Donald Smith, “QDR Will Help the Military Make Changes, England Says,” DefenseLink 
News Articles, 2 February 2006 [article online]; available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14967; Internet; accessed 2 November 2007. 
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support the USG’s strategic direction.73  By the end of 2006, the U.S. Army and USMC 
made another leap forward by superseding all previous COIN manuals with the new Field 
Manual 3-34, Counterinsurgency.  Most recently, USSOCOM and the USMC took the 
first step down the IW “roadmap” by producing the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 
Concept in order to address the future approach to IW.74 
C. IRREGULAR WARFARE JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT VERSION 1.0 
1.  Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of the IW JOC “is to describe how future joint force commanders 
(JFCs) could conduct protracted IW to accomplish national strategic objectives in the 
2014-2026 timeframe.”75  Not only is it designed to guide the development and 
integration of DoD concepts on the conduct of IW, but it provides a baseline for further 
debate and discussion, and development of new doctrine, organization, training, material, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes.76  The IW JOC 
was created in conjunction with the Major Combat Operations (MCO) and Stabilization, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) Joint Operating Concepts 
(JOCs).  “The IW JOC is integral to the conduct of MCO and Military Support to 
SSTRO. It complements the conduct of Deterrence Operations and Shaping 
Operations.”77  It enhances existing JOCs, and offers both complementary and competing 
ideas for ways and means to address strategic and operational challenges. The IW JOC 
addresses the following aspects that are not covered in current JOCs: 
• Theater strategy for IW. 
•  IW campaign design, planning, and execution. 
• Global scale of IW operations. 
                                                 
73 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 6 February 2006), 1. 
74 DoD, IW JOC, 12. 
75 Ibid., 5. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Iibd., 14. 
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• Protracted timeframe of IW. 
• Offensive applications of IW, particularly against hostile armed groups 
operating in non-belligerent states. 
The Venn diagram shown in Figure 8 depicts the overlapping relationship each JOC has 
with the others.   
 
Figure 8.   Joint Operating Concepts Relationships   
The scope of the IW JOC remains at the operational-level solutions. “It does not 
provide a tactical description of how to conduct IW operations but instead introduces new 
conditions and capability needs for IW.”78  This is essential to current and future 
understanding in “how” IW is defined. 
2. Defining Irregular Warfare 
Definitions provide a common understanding of doctrinal terms and emerging 
concepts in the conduct of warfare.  The following definitions of IW and conventional 
warfare establish the baseline for understanding the fundamental differences in the 
application of IW versus conventional warfare. 
                                                 
78 DoD, IW JOC, 14. 
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a. IW JOC Working Definition 
The IW JOC defines Irregular Warfare as: “A violent struggle among state 
and non-state actors for legitimacy over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”79  But the IW 
JOC also states, “IW is complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous,” therefore, making it 
necessary to address some basic definitional issues before continuing. 80   
b. Irregular versus Conventional 
Without becoming collared in a debate about the precise definition and 
division between “irregular warfare” and “conventional warfare”, there is a need to 
clarify how both of these terms are used by the U.S. military. “Irregular warfare” (IW) 
follows the definition above, and is in line with the concepts put forth in the 2006 QDR. 
“Put succinctly, irregular warfare involves indirect forms of military operations, while 
relying on any and all relevant force capacities to gain ‘asymmetric advantages’ and 
weaken or destroy the capability and power of the adversary concerned.”81 This is in 
contrast with “conventional warfare” that is not defined in any U.S. military doctrinal 
publications.  However, for the purposes of this thesis, “conventional warfare” is defined 
as warfare between states that employs direct engagement, aimed at undermining or 
destroying each other’s capacity to make war. This may include efforts to capture and/or 
hold territory in order to influence an adversary’s government or policies.82 Thus 
conventional warfare is grounded in the proven doctrines of attack, defend, and 
withdrawal. At the same time, following the successes of the First Gulf War and the 
initial stages of OIF, conventional warfare is increasingly being viewed as “short wars,” 
                                                 
79 DoD, IW JOC, 6. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Mark T. Berger et. Al. 
82 Jeffrey L. Hasler, “Defining War: New Doctrinal Definitions of Irregular, Conventional and 
Unconventional Warfare”, Special Warfare, vol, 20, no, 2, (March-April 2007), 19-21.  Also see 
Department of Defense (DoD), Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0. (11 
SEP 2007), 7-8. 
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in contrast to protracted deployment of massive and sustained force, which characterized 
the traditional “American Way of War”.83  Linked to this, and of considerable relevance, 
is the fact that conventional warfare is understood to take place between legitimate 
sovereign states. By contrast, at least within the scope of military doctrine, IW is 
understood to be a form of military operations aimed at removing a legitimate or 
sovereign government, in a far more indirect and discrete fashion of influencing the 
population, as opposed to conventional warfare’s focus on removing a legitimate or 
sovereign government through direct military defeat (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9.   Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare.84 
c. Operations and Activities that Comprise IW 
IW is comprised of a variety of operational and tactical level operations 
and activities that historically occured on the periphery of conventional warfare.  This is 
important in further refining the theory of IW as an approach to warfighting and not just 
                                                 
83 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977; first published, 1973); Max Boot, “The New 
American Way of War” Foreign Affairs, vol 82, no 4 (July-August, 2003). 
84 DoD, IW JOC, 8.  NOTE: The IW JOC Figure 9 is primarily attributed to Dr. Gordon McCormick’s 
“Mystic Diamond” Model, and his work on understanding insurgencies and the fundamental differences of 
the direct and indirect approaches to warfare. 
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an operational theme.  Although, the following activities could easily be applied to the 
context of a conventional warfare, these represent the specific range of operations 
conducted as part of IW:85  
• Insurgency 
• Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
• Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
• Terrorism 
• Counterterrorism (CT) 
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
• Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations 
(SSTRO) 
• Strategic Communications 
• Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
• Information Operations (IO) 
• Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
• Intelligence and counterintelligence activities 
• Transnational criminal activities 
• Law enforcement activities focused on irregular threats 
“In practice, most wars and campaigns are hybrids of conventional and IW operations.  
The balance or primary focus of [these activities and] operations gives a war, campaign, 
or major operation its predominant character.”  The next step analyzes how the 
instruments of national power are leveraged in the conduct of IW. 
3. diMe versus DImE in the IW Environment 
The unique challenge in the conduct of IW is the need to take a balanced or 
potentially imbalanced approach to the effective use of the instruments of national power.   
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006) states that 
success in the GWOT “involves using military force and other instruments [elements] of 
national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any 
                                                 
85 Hasler, 20. 
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nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of 
support.”86  This concept is not new to the history of warfare.  However, due to the 
inherent political nature of IW the military component of DIME (diplomatic, intelligence, 
military, and economics) should be a supporting rather than supported effort.  This is 
compounded by the paradox that direct military action by the USG frequently detracts 
from the long-term legitimacy of a failing state.87  This is contrary to the short-term 
benefits of U.S. provided security and stability.  Unlike conventional warfare where the 
military element is the focus of all national efforts and supported by the other three, in 
IW the military finds itself in a balanced effort, or more often than not in a “supporting 
effort” to the other USG and partner nation elements.  Therefore, IW campaign planning 
and execution considerations cannot focus solely on the military.  This is in contrast to 
traditional conventional warfare, where the U.S. military is the “supported effort” (Figure 
10). 
 
Figure 10.   Conventional versus Irregular War Planning and Execution 
Therefore, in IW planning and execution an inherent need arises for establishing a 
process that affords the JFC and his staff the ability to address this paradox.  The joint 
planning and execution process must include a more indirect approach that is prepared 
for a protracted timeline, and unifies the interagency and partner nation components in a 
manner that all can be measured and assessed. 
                                                 
86 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington 
D.C.: The White House, March 2006), 9. 
87 DoD, IW JOC, 18. 
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4. “Winning the Will”: Indirect, Protracted, and Unified Action 
The IW JOC provides a solution for securing the legitimacy of the USG host 
nation partners, while denying the control, influence, and support of mutual adversaries.  
The “central ideal” of the concept is: 
The joint force will conduct protracted regional and global campaigns 
against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and 
exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional 
military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant 
populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary 
control, influence, and support. Unified action by the USG and its strategic 
partners is essential to winning an irregular war or campaign. While the 
direct application of military power may not be the primary means of 
winning IW, joint forces will often be required to support non-military 
instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success.88 
The key IW elements that can be draw out from this “central idea” are an “indirect 
approach”; that is “protracted” in nature; and combines the “unified action” of all USG 
and HN elements of national power.  The relative complexity of bringing these elements 
together under a holistic approach to warfare requires a more agile joint force planning, 
execution, and assessment capabilities.89 
5. Needed Capabilities 
What the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the 2006 IW JOC and the 2006 QDR 
all have in a common is a message calling for irregular warfare capabilities.90  The 
current and future joint force needs to have the critical inherent skill set for campaign 
design, planning and force preparation, as well as, an operational mission set for the 
                                                 
88 DoD, IW JOC, 19. 
89 Ibid., 33. also see Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of The United States of 
America (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005); Department of Defense, Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006); and The White 
House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White 
House, March 2006). 
90 NOTE: The 2006 QDR analyzed the current state of transformation in the U.S. Military and 
identified an imbalance between conventional and irregular capabilities.  In order to better prepare the 
current force for ongoing efforts to defeat the United State’s adversaries in its GWOT that imbalance must 
be addressed. 
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irregular operational environment.91  As the 2006 QDR points out, in order for this to 
happen a shift will have to occur away from “traditional” capabilities.  This shift will 
better address future irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges.92  USSOCOM 
sought to validate this capability “shift” in U.S. Army’s United Quest 2007 (UQ 07) 
Wargame series. 
D. UNIFIED QUEST 07: SHORTFALLS AND STRENGTHS OF THE IW JOC 
The U.S. Army executes the “U.S. Army’s Future Warfare Study Plan” under the 
title of Unified Quest.93  It is comprised of a series of seminars, workshops, and 
wargames used to explore current operational problems.  “UQ 07 employed [a] ‘bottom-
up’ approach to examine the operational challenges of conducting UW and Stability, 
Support, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations as part of Full Spectrum 
Operations.”94  UQ 07 provided USSOCOM an opportunity to test the operational 
theories developed in the IW JOC and the application of IW in the larger context of the 
GWOT.  The findings of UQ 07 addressed potential impacts to USSOCOM’s 
organizational, personnel, training and operational capabilities.  The major finding’s of 
the USSOCOM UQ 07 analytical team not only validated the key ideas of the IW JOC, 
but identified the new and unique challenges conducting IW, and the requirement for a 
very different approach.95  The team’s report states, “While the deliberate planning 
associated with traditional warfare has proven successful in direct inter-state 
engagements, players recognized the need for a different type of planning, assessment 
and preparation for IW.”96 
                                                 
91 see Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America 
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005); Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006); and The White House, The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House, March 
2006). 
92 DoD, QDR Report, 19. 
93 Unified Quest 2007: U.S. Special Operations Command Analytical Report, (USSOCOM, 4 June 
2007), 1. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 5-17. 
96 Ibid., 6. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The current round of policy, doctrinal, and academic engagement on the conduct 
of IW continues.  This new era is attempting to establish IW as an approach to warfare 
and not just an “operational theme,” despite the fact that the IW JOC falls short in 
providing the critical staff thinking process to execute prescribed “holistic” approach to 
IW.  If the findings of UQ 07 are presumed to be correct, then the next step is the 
development of a critical staff thinking process that complements these new prevailing 
concepts.  Fortunately, Special Operations Command Pacific in late 2004 made a similar 
paradigm shift to a more indirect approach to its own WOT efforts in the Pacific theater.  
SOCPAC’s efforts serve as a logical case study for analyzing the “coupling” of irregular 












IV.  SOCPAC CASE STUDY 
A.   INTRODUCTION: 
In January 2005, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) began a 
process of reevaluating the WOT operational level strategy it designed for the Pacific 
Theater.  SOCPAC conducted an internal strategic estimate to develop a baseline for 
where SOCPAC’s efforts were focused and how they aligned with the strategic picture of 
the Pacific Theater at the time.  This estimate served as a framework to initially refocus 
the unique capabilities of special operations forces (SOF) to the WOT in the Pacific.97  
The estimate identified an existing gap in the SOCPAC staff process that failed to 
effectively insure resources were balanced against WOT objectives to combat terrorism 
in the Pacific Theater.  In order to fill this gap, SOCPAC expanded on the evolving 
USJFCOM EBA process.  This new command philosophy emphasized an indirect 
approach to the WOT.  It sought to leverage the maturity and expertise, trust, and 
confidence of special operations forces through a more indirect approach in theater.98  
The command believed that an effects-based approach coupled with a more indirect focus 
provided the framework to successfully achieve U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) 
WOT objectives.     
B.   OVERVIEW OF SOCPAC MISSION: 
SOCPAC serves as a subordinate unified command to USPACOM.  SOCPAC 
and its component units deploy throughout the Pacific Theater in support of 
USPACOM‘s deliberate plans, contingencies, the Theater Security Cooperation Program 
(TSCP), and the WOT.  Through the routine conduct of bilateral exchanges, joint and 
combined training events, and operational deployments, SOCPAC elements foster 
interoperability with host partner nations and interagency partners within the Pacific 
                                                 
97 Jeff McKaughan, "Pacific Warrior, Building Capacity and Partnerships Throughout the Region." 
Special Operations Technology, Issue 5, Volume 2 (2007): 26. 
98 Ibid., 29. 
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Theater.  The command is also tasked to maintain the capability to operate as a rapidly 
deployable Joint Task Force (JTF).99  “Today, SOCPAC forces are operating throughout 
the Pacific Theater in close concert with U.S. Embassies to increase partner nation 
capabilities to defeat terrorism and insurgencies, and address underlying conditions that 
support terrorism.”100 
SOCPAC executes its WOT requirements not only as a sub-unified command of 
USPACOM, but also as the regional theater special operations command (TSOC) for 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is the mission of USSOCOM to lead, 
plan, synchronize, and as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks.  
USSOCOM also trains, organizes, equips and deploys combat ready special operations 
forces to combatant commands.101  SOCPAC is required to synchronize the regional 
WOT efforts in the Pacific with USSOCOM’s national level GWOT planning.  SOCPAC 
serves as the vital conduit linking the efforts of USSOCOM as the GWOT Command 
with USPACOM the Pacific Theaters Regional Combatant Command. 
C.   SOCPAC IN THE GWOT 2002 TO 2005 PUT TABS IN ALL HEADINGS 
1. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines 2002-2004 
In January of 2002, SOCPAC deployed JTF 510, comprised of 1,300 U.S. troops, 
to the southern Philippines.102  JTF 510 conducted counterterrorist operations against the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)103 working by, through, and with the Armed Forces of the 
                                                 
99 "What is SOCPAC?" Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC); available from 
http://www.socpac.socom.mil/; Internet; accessed 2 October 2007. 
100 McKaughan, 26. 
101 "United States Special Operations Command Mission" Headquarters, United States Special 
Operations Command (USSCOM); available from http://www.socom.mil/Docs/Command_Mission-
060214.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 October 2007. 
102 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” Military Review VOL LXXXVI, 
NO. 06 (November-December 2006): 6. 
103 NOTE: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a Muslim terrorist group operating in the southern 
Philippines. It conducted numerous kidnappings for profit prior to 9/11.  The ASG’s most notable 
kidnapping was Martin and Gracie Burnham, two American missionaries on 27 May 2001.  ASG moved to 
Basilan Island.  Since 9/11 it has conducted several small bombings.  The most notable is the February 
2004 Super Ferry 14 bombing in Manila Bay, killing 132. 
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Philippines (AFP) under the moniker of the bilateral exercise series BALIKATAN 
(roughly translates to “shoulder to shoulder” or “shouldering the load together”).104    The 
U.S. air component was stationed in Mactan, Cebu with logistics and the JTF 
Headquarters stationed in Zamboanga, Mindanao comprised the bulk of the more than 
1,300 man force.   Only 160 United States Special Forces and 340 Navy Construction 
Team (Seabees105 and USMC Security) personnel located on Basilan Island comprised 
the tip of the spear (see Figure11). 
 
 
Figure 11.   Map of Balikatan 02-1.106 
 
                                                 
104 "Exercise Balikatan." GlobalSecurity.org; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007. 
105 NOTE:  Seabee is not an acronym.  It comes from the pronunciation of the abbreviation for 
Construction Battalion or CB.  It has become the nick name of the Naval Construction Teams.  It dates 
back to World War II. 
106 NOTE: Original map from: "Philippines." CIA – The World Factbook, (1 November 2007); 
available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html; Internet; 
accessed 3 October 2007. 
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On 1 September 2002, JTF 510 redeployed to Camp Smith, Hawaii leaving 
behind elements to form Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).107   
JSOTF-P continued operations along with the AFP for over 2 years on Basilan Island.  
Today, the environment on Basilan no longer fosters terrorist activity. 108 Within the first 
year, the ASG ranks “shrank from 800 to 80 on Basilan Island and several of their senior 
leaders where arrested or killed.”109 
It is important to understand how this success on Basilan impacted the 
development of SOCPAC’s EBA system.   When Special Operations Technology asked 
LTG David P. Fridovich (then SOCPAC Commander and the initial Special Forces 
Group Commander on Basilan Island) how he measured success with JSOTF-P 
operations he answered:  
After two years on Basilan Island . . . the environment no longer fostered 
terrorist activities and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) left the island.  The 
AFP [sic Armed Forces of the Philippines] effectively drained the swamp 
of underlying conditions with our assistance. The Basilan people now live 
in a safe and secure environment. As a result, the AFP downsized their 
presence from 15 infantry battalions down to 2 battalions on Basilan 
Island. By guaranteeing security, the AFP made it safe for teachers and 
doctors to return to Basilan. Private business and non-governmental 
organizations also operate in an area they once shunned. The AFP won 
back the support of the local population and the Philippine government, 
producing a long-lasting effect . . . The Basilan people chose to support 
government and not the ASG.110 
The success on Basilan became the foundation of SOCPAC’s model for conduct of IW in 
support of WOT operations in the Southern Philippines, and the greater Pacific Theater.  
The formula employed by then COL Fridovich comprised of: preparing the environment 
through early population surveys and assessment; determining what objectives and 
                                                 
107 "What is SOCPAC?" Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC); available from 
http://www.socpac.socom.mil/; Internet; accessed 2 October 2007. 
108 David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific, The Special Operations Forces 
Indirect Approach." Joint Forces Quarterly 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 26. 
109 ADM Thomas Fargo, "PASOC 2003." USPACOM Speeches and Transcripts, 10 February 2003. 
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associated tasks were needed to achieve success; and continued assessment throughout 
the operation in order to ensure focus and maximize flexibility of his limited resources 
(160 USSF and 340 Navy Seabees and USMC security).  This basic formula developed 
by then COL Fridovich and his staff had all the makings of an effects-based approach.  
They were able to maximize their payoff and it resulted in measurable military, 
economic, social, and political success on Basilan Island. 
2. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines 2004-2005 
However, SOCPAC did not fully recognize the payoff of the early Basilan efforts 
immediately.  In early January 2004, JSOTF-P was completely reorganized.  The focus of 
the effort placed on USSF advisor teams paired with those AFP Brigades nearest to 
known ASG sanctuaries.  Advising the AFP in direct action capture/kill missions became 
the primary mission of the command.111  SOCPAC looked for a way to show the 
"success" of a more direct approach to operations working through and by the AFP in the 
Philippines.  The only metric SOCPAC used at this time was a kill/capture count tracked 
weekly on a command briefing slide. 112  The accuracy of that slide was a priority, and it 
became the primary means for measuring SOCPAC and JSOTF-Ps success in the 
Southern Philippines.113  Regardless of the debate over the effectiveness of the direct 
approach strategy, this is the first time SOCPAC attempted to apply a metric of success to 
its WOT efforts. 
3. TSCP and the Pacific Special Operations Conference 
From 2002 to 2005 SOCPAC continued to execute its portion of USPACOM’s 
TSCP events and the annual Pacific Special Operations Conference (PASOC) in order to 
maintain its long established engagement requirements.   The focus of these events had 
obviously shifted towards a WOT focus.  However, the planning and execution of the 
traditional Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter-Narcotics Training 
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(CNT), Counter-Terrorism Training (CT), and annual Bilateral/Multinational Exercise 
events changed very little from pre-9/11 standards.114 
With both conventional and special operations resources being pulled to support 
the continuing efforts in both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN (OEF-A), the command needed to find a 
process to focus its reduced resources that provided maximum flexibility and payoff.  
SOCPAC found itself in a situation not unlike those early Gulf War air targeting planners 
that had to find the most effective means of targeting Iraq Defenses in Kuwait with a 
limited number of available sorties.  What resulted is a process that SOCPAC hopes will 
provide focus for the unified effort of U.S. military component, interagency, and partner 
nation contributions to IW in the Pacific that can be measured and assessed. 
D. EVOLUTION OF EBA AT SOCPAC: 
In January of 2005 SOCPAC began to refocus its effort in the WOT.  SOCPAC 
viewed fighting the WOT “not as a series of discrete functional events but rather as an 
integrated effort to achieve objectives and end states.”115  SOCPAC started out by asking 
four primary questions: 
(1) How do we plan, guide and synchronize the WOT: through, with and 
by, host nations? 
(2) Does the current synchronization process for the WOT prioritize and 
focus our efforts? 
(3) As the Inter-Agency National Implementation Plan (NIP) supporting 
activity process develops for the WOT, how do we nominate activities? 
(4) How do we measure our progress in achieving WOT objectives and 
end-states?116 
                                                 
114 Michael P. Sullivan, unpublished professional journal, September-November 2004. 
115 David P. Fridovich, "SOCPAC Effects-Based Approach Command Brief (Unclassified)" (Special 
Operations Command Pacific, Camp Smith, HI, copy of slide obtained via E-mail, 2 February 2007), 2. 
116 Ibid. 
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A common theme emerged.  The planning and execution of the future WOT operational 
level strategy could not simple focus on unilateral and purely military solutions.117  
SOCPAC needed to find a more indirect approach of working through, by, and with 
partner nations and incorporate the other instruments of national power to be more 
effective with its and USPACOM’s efforts. 
1. Strategic Estimate 
From December 2004 to early spring 2005 SOCPAC took a comprehensive look 
at the entire Pacific Theater.  The estimate sought to identify where SOCPAC needed to 
continue or change its focus for the WOT, TSCP, conventional war plans, and other 
existing programs.118  The SOCPAC Special Operations Joint Plans office or SOJ5 was 
assigned the task to develop the strategic estimate.  The document divided the theater into 
several sub-regional categories.  This estimate identified several key areas of emphasis 
for the command.   By adapting a regional approach to theater level operations, the 
estimate laid the framework for the adoption of a more systems based analysis throughout 
the command.  Also, the estimate helped to synchronize SOCPAC's campaign planning 
with USSOCOM and USPACOM efforts.   
2. CARVER Matrix SOCPAC's First Systems Approach 
In late 2004 early 2005, just prior to the SOJ5s development of the strategic 
estimate, the SOCPAC SOJ3 (Operations) developed a small targeting cell to analyze 
weaknesses in the terrorist organizations operating in the southern Philippines.  This 
small group began what would be the first "systems analysis" of the terrorist networks in 
the Pacific Theater.119 This early targeting effort looked for critical nodes to kinetically 
attack in order to produce the desired effect of bringing down the ASG and Jemaah 
                                                 
117 Fridovich, "SOCPAC Effects-Based Approach Command Brief (Unclassified)" 3. 
118 McKaughan, 26. 
119 Eric Walker, E-mail to Michael P. Sullivan (author), 9 October 2007. 
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Islamiah (JI)120, terrorist network in Southeast Asia.  The cell used the CARVER 
targeting analysis technique developed by U.S. Army Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF).  This technique is used during mission planning to assess mission, validity, 
and requirements, and technical appreciation of a designated target.121 
CARVER is an acronym made up of the following factors that encompass a 
designated target: criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and 
recognizablity factors.  These factors assist the planners in selecting the best targets or 
components of a given target to attack.  Each factor is considered and assigned a 
numerical value.  These values are then place in a decision matrix and the sum of the 
values generates the desirability to attack a given target or component.122 At the strategic 
or operational level of analysis, the CARVER process can provide a list of the enemy’s 
systems or subsystems.  At the tactical level it can list component of subsystems ideal for 
attack based on the component that receives the highest score (for example Figure 12 
displays a sample matrix for a Bulk Power Supply Facility.)123 
                                                 
120 NOTE:  Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is militant Islamic organization created in Indonesia that promotes 
the establishment of an Islamic state that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Southern Philippines, 
Singapore, and Brunei.  JI is known for the 2002 car bombing of a Bali nightclub, killing 202; the 2003 car 
bombing of the J.W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12; and the 2004 car bombing of the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta, killing 8.  JI is known for its ties to both the Al Qaeda Network and Abu Sayyaf Group 
in the Southern Philippines. 
121 Field Manual (FM) 34-36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare 
Operations, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 September 1991); available 
from http://www.fas.org/irp/DoDdir/army/fm34-36/appd.htm; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007. 




Figure 12.   Sample Matrix for Bulk Power Supply Facility 
The SOCPAC targeting cell attempted to apply this same basic CARVER process 
to targeting the terrorist network in the southern Philippines.  The first step was defining 
those specific subcomponents that made up the terrorist network.  Terrorist networks do 
not operate in the exact same manner as a traditional nation-state.  The operational 
environment (OE) that makes up the total terrorist system is not comprised of the 
political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII) 
subsystems.  After evaluating historical data and current intelligence the SOCPAC 
targeting cell defined the terrorist subsystems into the marketing, training, finance, 
recruiting, infrastructure, and communication (MTFRIC) subsystems.  By redefining the 
adversary’s subsystems the SOCPAC targeting cell believed it could reveal more 
effective options to engage and influence the enemy and relevant population.  It is 
important to note that the MTFRIC subsystems overlap and interact through the same 
“node and link” relationship described earlier.  Furthermore, the nodes in the terrorist 
MTFRIC subsystems may have links to the nation-state PMESII subsystems.  In theory 
this gave the SOCPAC targeting cell multiple centers of gravity (COGs) to target.  The 
multiple subsystem concept also validated the potential benefits of indirectly affecting the 
terrorist networks by removing identified COGs (see Figure 13.) 
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Figure 13.   Centers of Gravity Across MTFRIC and PMESII Subsystems 
Conceptually, CARVER was used to prioritize hundreds of nodes that make up 
these various categories.  This effort was beneficial in forcing SOCPAC to contemplate 
the complexity of conducting IW.  The work also validated the need for an interagency 
approach especially when targeting non-military subsystems and nodes. However, the 
CARVER model was eventually dropped because it was too conceptual and did not deal 
with "actual" nodes.  It provided an expanded framework for planning using a systems 
approach to understanding the operational environment as an interdependent system of 
systems.  This lead the targeting cell to explore the evolving USJFCOM concepts of EBO 
and EBA as a more concrete targeting tool for the WOT. 
E. SOCPAC’S EBA MODEL: 
By August 2005, SOCPAC expanded and formalized the efforts of the early 
targeting cell by adopting USJFCOM’s evolving concepts of an effects-based approach to 
operations. By adopting an effects-based approach, SOCPAC attempted to successfully 
incorporate a more indirect approach to the WOT, executing through, by, and with 
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partner nations.124  It was believed that an effects-based methodology would enhance the 
already existing Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP).  Thus, EBA would enhance the command’s ability to more 
efficiently utilize limited resources and synchronize SOCPAC component, USPACOM 
component, and interagency actions in the WOT.  “Rather than focusing campaign 
planning and execution solely on component task accomplishment, an effects-based 
approach seeks to influence or change behavior through integrated application of select 
instruments of national power to support the U.S. Government’s (USG’s) GWOT 
objectives.”125  The first step was the development of a dedicated effects cell within the 
SOCPAC staff. 
1. Effects Cell 
The SOCPAC Effects Cell (EC) is aligned under the commander’s immediate 
administrative staff or SOJ00 and coded SOJ00EC.  The EC stands alone as a unique 
staff element in order to serve all of the SOCPAC staff in the accomplishment of both 
deliberate and crisis action planning, execution, and assessment by leveraging all 
elements of an effects-based approach.126  The EC serves as the base of the Joint Effects 
Cell and includes separate planners, analysts, and a fires element.  It functions as the core 
effects-based approach experts within the command and is organized as depicted in 
Figure 14.  The EC is manned with 11 Military Joint Theater Distribution positions and 
one SOJ2 intelligence analyst.   
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125 Ibid. 
126 SOCPAC EC Charter, 5. 
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Figure 14.   Effects Cell Organization.127 
The Effects Cell's primary purpose is to enhance the current planning process by 
incorporating a system of systems analysis (SoSA) of both the OE and the enemy.  It 
does this by utilizing a deliberate planning database tool that methodically and fully 
integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power.  The cell 
accomplishes this through the SOCPAC Effects Cell Process and its management of four 
major functions (Knowledge Base Development, Effects-Based Planning, Effects-Based 
Execution, and Effects-Based Assessment). 
2. SOCPAC Effects Cell Process: 
a.  Knowledge Base Development 
"Knowledge Base Development" is a continuous process that provides the 
foundation for the implementation of an effects-based approach.  It provides SOCPAC 
with a full understanding of the OE, available resources, and flexibility to use those 
resources effectively.  The knowledge base development is managed through a 
combination of an Operational Net Assessment (ONA) database, and routine 
                                                 
127 SOCPAC EC Charter, 5. 
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“wargaming” of Red (enemy), Green/Grey (ally/host-nation) objectives and potential 
responses to Blue (U.S./Coalition) actions, intentions, or perceptions.  The command uses 
a web-based Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) to enhance coordination and 
collaboration of primary staff elements.128 
The ONA database for the SOCPAC WOT focus areas is populated with 
data on enemy and friendly systems, organizations, characteristics, and relationships.  
The EC and its corresponding working groups use SoSA to “identify, analyze, and relate 
the goals and objectives, organizations, dependencies and inter-dependencies, external 
influences, and other aspects of the various systems of sub-systems.”129  This is 
accomplished by using PMESII and MTFRIC filters for each friendly and enemy system.  
The ONA Analyst then uses known intelligence and open source information to conduct 
a nodal analysis identifying linkages between PMESII and MTFRIC subsystems.  This 
allows effects planners to then identify key nodes to target resources or actions against in 
order to achieve desired effects.  This analysis is further validated by the Red/Green/Blue  
wargaming.  The effort produces an effect-node-action-resource linkage and planners use 
this to refine their thinking during the mission analysis and COA determination 
processes.130 
b. Effects Based Planning 
As stated, effect-based planning (EBP) attempts to integrate all aspects of 
national power (DIME) within the OE in order to create a desired effect necessary to 
achieve the commander’s objectives.  SOCPAC uses EBP to recommend potential COAs 
for the commander’s decision in order to achieve WOT objectives.  “EBP emphasizes 
connecting theater objectives to tactical tasks through the attainment of desired effects 
within the operational environment.”131  The tasks are assessed separately from the 
desired effect through the use of a Measure of Performance (MOP).  MOPs are only 
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focused on task accomplishment, and it is primarily the responsibility of the SOJ5.  This 
is because MOPs answer the question, “Are we doing things right?”132  The SOJ5 
planner can then take that assessment and adjust plans for future action based on the cost 
benefit analysis provided by SOCPAC's effects-based assessment process. 
c. Effects-Based Assessment 
"What is the return on the investment?" This was one of the recurring 
themes for former USPACOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon when briefed on 
OEF-P operations and SOCPAC’s WOT efforts in the Pacific Theater.133  ADM Fallon 
knew he had very few resources at his disposal in executing the WOT in his AOR, and he 
wanted reassurance that objectives were being met.  The SOCPAC's effects-based 
assessment process is an integral part to identifying the operational progress achieved or 
not achieved.  The primary criteria to perform this assessment are Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE).  Each command objective is further refined by the effects needed 
to achieve that objective.  MOE are tied to the assessment of individual desired effects.  
Each MOE measures changes in PMESII and MTFRIC systems and essentially aid the 
analyst to answer, “Are we doing the right things?”134  SOCPAC uses the online 
collaborative Effects Based Assessment Support System (EBASS) as the command's 
assessment management tool.  EBASS attempts to provide a “near-objective, metric-
based evaluation of environmental conditions that represent an overall effect.”135 
d. Effects Based Cycle and Process 
SOCPAC executes its effects-based approach through a baseline 16 week 
cycle, with a six-week cycle sustainment cycle.  There are three cross-functional elements 
that are part of the SOCPAC matrix-like staff organization.  These are: the Operational 
Net Assessment Working Group (ONAWG); the Effects Assessment Cell (EAC); and the 
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Effects Working Group (EWG).  Additionally, the Executive Effects Working Group (E-
EWG) provides the final guidance and decisions to focus the primary cells and groups 
across the command.  The Process is outline in Figure 15 (SOCPAC EBA Battle 
Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle).  It starts with the initial commander’s 
guidance and his list of primary objectives, which in turn define the focus of the EBA 
planning effort.  Next the ONAWG conducts a Blue/Red/Green wargame in order to 
develop the initial SoSA; identify key nodes; conduct a comparative analysis of each 
player's actions; and establishes expected baseline effects that link to critical nodes.  The 
commander’s objectives are now effectively linked to associated effects.  The E-EWG 
then conducts a baseline assessment to determine progress towards GWOT objectives.  
For example an effect could be a change in behavior of terrorist and/or host nation.  
Metrics are used to measure this effect based on a green, amber, or red system.  This 
assessment then feeds the EWG that determines the appropriate action/effort utilizing the 
correct DIME option.  This becomes the focused activity or tactical tasks to be completed  
(e.g., train host nation CT Unit).  Finally a post activity assessment is conducted to 
determine if desired effects were achieved.   These results are a cost-benefit analysis of 
each effort directed at GWOT objectives. 
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Figure 15.   SOCPAC EBA Battle Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle. 
The cycle when utilized correctly complemented SOCPAC’s shift to an 
indirect approach to operations in the WOT.   The cycle in theory established a process 
and criteria to measure success and the overall return on investment.  In order to 
understand “why” SOCPAC choose EBA it is important understanding “how” SOCPAC 
framed its indirect approach to the WOT. 
F. SOCPAC’S INDIRECT APPROACH AND EFFECTS-BASED THINKING 
In early 2005 SOCPAC began to shift its operational focus in the WOT to a more 
indirect approach.  The command began to focus more on the underlying conditions that 
foster terrorism in the Pacific theater, rather than purely conducting direct action “capture 
or kill” operations through, by and with partner nations.  The command’s first priority 
was to develop security and stability in the Philippines by shaping the environment 
through the use of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and civil-military 
operations.  The goal was a “method [that] promotes economic development and shapes 
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conditions for good governance and rule of law.”136   The method is protracted in nature 
and only works if the host nation’s leadership, military, law enforcement, U.S. 
interagency “Country Team” and USPACOM military forces (SOF and conventional) 
work in concert to build capacity and leverage each others’ strengths in a synchronized 
effort.137  SOCPAC drew on the success and lessons learned of earlier efforts during the 
earliest stage of OEF-P on Basilan Island.  By respecting the relevant population on 
Basilan, the legitimacy of host nation and American image improved.  This approach 
leads to a secure and stable environment that enables significant commerce and quality 
life improvements.138  SOCPAC focused on this lesson learned, and developed a three 
pronged approach to the conduct of IW in support of WOT objectives. 
1. Indirect Approach Elements: 
“Three elements constitute SOCPAC’s indirect approach in the Pacific region: 
institution-building, capacity-building and outside factors.”139  Each element serves to 
concentrate the instruments of national power in a holistic approach to warfare in the 
Pacific theater.  Each of these elements plug directly into SOCPAC’s effects-based 
thinking.   
a. Institution-building 
“Finding out how to get there [to the relevant population] first to give the 
people a leg up without creating resentment is an important aspect of institution-
building.”  SOCPAC’s role in this element was to support the construction of legitimate 
institutions of security, governance, rule of law, infrastructure, and economic stability. 
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b. Capacity-building 
SOCPAC used tools like the strategic estimate process and EBA to 
identify the capacity-building programs needed to build more professional and modern 
military forces within partner nations.  The direct effect is a more professional and 
proficient host nation force that respects and upholds the rule of law.  The indirect effect 
is the relevant population that now supports the now legitimate host nation government.   
This is accomplished through a protracted training plan coupled with interagency 
recommendation and buy-in.  The former SOCPAC commander stated, “We closely plan 
and coordinate our activities with our partner nations and U.S. embassies to ensure we are 
working with the right partners in the right areas at the right time.”140   However, 
SOCPAC was challenged with accomplishing these two objectives by tackling multiple 
outside factors. 
c. Outside Factors 
By early 2005, SOCPAC was left with a resource dilemma as operations 
in the Iraq and Afghanistan continue to require the majority of SOF resources worldwide.  
SOCPAC had to figure out “how to do more with less” due to the burden of increased 
SOF deployment and rotation schedules in support of OIF and OEF-A.141  In addition, 
SOCPAC was challenged with finding a way to impact the external network, resources, 
and ideology of its adversaries through more indirect means as the lead for USSOCOM 
GWOT efforts in the Pacific.   
2. Effects-base Measurement of an Indirect Approach 
SOCPAC incorporated an effects-based approach in order to have meaningful 
criteria for judging success and failure.  The effects-based thinking gives the command a 
method to mitigate outside factors while prioritizing tasks in conducting an irregular 
campaign focused on institution and capacity building efforts.  The command laid out a 
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framework for a protracted 5-10 year campaign plan to shape conditions in the Pacific 
theater that promote commerce, rule of law, and education.  SOCPAC thought that these 
objectives could be accomplished by directly impacting the conditions that promote 
despair and violence.  Indirectly, terrorist networks would then be isolated from the 
relevant population now that a legitimate alternative was provided by SOCPAC’s efforts 
in the Pacific theater.142  
G.  SUMMARY: 
“In the end, the only meaningful criteria for judging SOF strategy and operations 
in the war on terror in Southeast Asia are the results and changes that ensue.”143  
SOCPAC’s adopted an effects-based approach in order to enable a more consistent and 
accurate assessment of their success in conducting IW in USPACOM's WOT efforts.  
SOCPAC’s EBA looks beyond military centric indicators, providing the commander with 
the means to improve effectiveness during current operations and in planning future IW 
efforts.  SOCPAC’s indirect approach to the WOT managed by an EBA aims to 
methodically assesses those conditions that create instability, improve the socioeconomic 
and security situation at hand by enhancing the legitimacy of local government, and 
severing ties with terrorist networks.144  Whether this is the best approach and applicable 
beyond the Pacific theater is the focus of the next chapter. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SOCPAC MODEL: APPLYING AN 
EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO IRREGULAR WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
SOCPAC developed an irregular warfare model that has the potential of achieving 
security, stability, and peace in the protracted environment of the WOT.  SOCPAC 
recognized in early 2005 that a unilateral direct approach campaign strategy was not the 
answer.  Success in the WOT would need to rely on targeting the ideology and conditions 
that contribute to terrorism by working “by, through, and with” host nation partners 
throughout the Pacific theater.  SOCPAC understood that a traditional direct approach 
strategy did not necessary apply to an operational environment where the primary 
strategic and operational objective is control of over the relevant population rather than 
terrain.  In order to control or influence the population SOCPAC believed the full range 
of military resources along with the application of the other instruments of national 
power were required to succeed.  However, just like the participants of Unified Quest 07 
would later find out, SOCPAC identified a gap in the existing Joint Operations Planning 
Process and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) doctrine and 
the need for a unique planning and assessment capabilities needed to conduct an IW 
campaign.  To fill this gap SOCPAC turned to target planning tools like CARVER and 
early EBO theory before finally choosing an effects-based approach (EBA) as the 
solution.  An analysis of SOCPAC’s model provides a starting point in understanding 
how EBA has the potential to fill the critical planning and execution gap that exists in the 
current Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. 
B. SOCPAC’S MODEL: INDIRECT AND EFFECTS-BASED 
SOCPAC effects-based approach to the conduct of IW helps the command 
prioritize efforts, shift resources and ensure that the indirect approach remains focused 
and balanced.145  The strength in SOCPAC’s model is two-fold.  First by conducting 
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irregular warfare through an indirect approach SOCPAC overcomes the shortcomings of 
a pure attrition-based strategy.  The conventional wisdom of finding, fixing, and 
eliminating the enemy has proven difficult in the GWOT.  SOCPAC cannot simply plan 
and execute a strategy based on unilateral direct-action missions into sovereign countries 
in the Pacific theater.   To succeed, it must blend host nation capacity-building and long-
term efforts that address root causes of terrorism and instability as well as eliminate the 
existing threat in theater..146  The consequence of a purely conventional attrition-based 
strategy is politically, economically, and socially untenable, and no attrition-style 
campaign could be so successful as to eliminate all potential terrorists.  SOCPAC turned 
to an indirect strategy governed by an effects-based approach to operations because it 
provides a framework to purposefully shape the interactions of the actors in a complex 
irregular environment.147 
Second, SOCPAC’s model works within the current U.S. military construct by 
simply attaching to and amplifying current joint command and staff operation doctrine.  
The model complements and enhances the commander’s ability to intuitively balance his 
military actions with the other instruments of national power. It does not replace the 
commander’s years of experience or limit his courses of action (COAs).  On the contrary, 
the process better informs his staff and him on how to best shape the operating 
environment to achieve success in an asymmetric fight.  The result is a staff thinking 
process that complements the commander’s own coup d’eil (strategic vision) in 
identifying those military operations that best complement unified action in a protracted 
WOT campaign.  The use of an effects-based approach has provided the command with 
the advantages being able to conduct a cost benefit analysis, focuses the “logical lines of 
operation”148 and its ease of integration and adaptation of the existing joint doctrine to a 
more holistic application of all the instruments of national power. 
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1. Advantages 
a. Provides Cost Benefit Analysis 
Application of an effects-based approach to irregular warfare improved 
clarity in tactical employment in the Philippines, particularly when conditions change and 
assigned tasks are no longer viable.  SOCPAC allowed itself the ability to be more 
consistent and accurate in assessing its success in the Philippines by looking beyond 
military centric indicators.  This is achieved by measuring effects at all levels through the 
use of pre-defined measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance 
(MOPs) to determine changes in the environment (see Figure 16).  As the example in 
Figure 16 displays the MOEs and MOPs when used in concert enable the SOCPAC staff 
to assess effects of a joint/combined Department of State (DOS), Joint Special Operations 
Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) and Republic of the Philippines (RP) Humanitarian 
Military Assistance project and the resulting impact on the local population’s response to 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).  The resulting assessment gives SOCPAC a 
metric on its investment.   This then leads to validation of current engagement or the need 
for an alternate approach. 
 
Figure 16.   MOE and MOP Assessment of Tasks and Effects Example 
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b. Focused on Logical Lines of Operation 
SOCPAC’s planners are better able to communicate their objectives to 
lower echelons for execution.  The use of PMESII and MTFRIC lines of operation 
provide a useful construct for the design of SOCPAC indirect campaign efforts in the 
Philippines and greater Southeast Asia.  Both PMESII and MTFRIC systems analysis 
enable the commander and staff to frame the problem and identify desired objectives and 
effects necessary for success.  This has provided a common operating context for 
integration of the operations and activities of non-military organizations and agencies.  
SOCPAC built an assessment schema for operations in the Philippines, and it has become 
directly nested within the way SOCPAC and USPACOM look at all countries in the 
AOR.  This has allowed the “effects to task” assessment to be integrated into the various 
echelons (strategic, operational, and tactical) in the Pacific theater.  JSOTF-P is now able 
to assess itself and the effects it is having on increasing the capacity of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines or in coordinating interagency efforts with the U.S. Embassy Country 
Team.149  By integrating a common operating context along logical lines of operation at 
both the JSOTF-P and USPACOM levels, SOCPAC established a baseline for long range 
investment in the effects-based process.   
c. Integrates into Current Joint Operations Planning and 
Execution System 
SOCPAC’s planning efforts guide joint operation planning at the 
operational level.  This effort links the operational and tactical employment of forces to 
strategic objectives.150  Effects are now a key element of operational design according to 
SOCPAC’s effects-based model.  Integration of EBA within the JOPP and JOPES seeks 
to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks and help the SOCPAC staff 
determine conditions for achieving WOT objectives in theater.151  As such, the EBA is 
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oriented at the operational and strategic levels of conflict and not the tactical.152  More 
specifically, “Thinking in terms of a direct or indirect approach and desired or undesired 
effects can help amplify the meaning of strategic and operational objectives, determine 
appropriate tasks and the best sequence of actions to accomplish them, develop more 
precise assessment measures, and use other elements of operational design more 
effectively”.153  
However, SOCPAC is still working to fully implement this new way of 
staff thinking throughout the command.  Several shortfalls have limited the full 
application of the effects-based process.  First and foremost SOCPAC has not achieved 
the level of interagency “buy-in” necessary to fully implement its IW efforts.  Second, the 
existing bureaucracy is currently at odds with acceptance of the new way of thinking, 
more so now given the high operations tempo.  This is manifested in SOCPAC staff 
resistance, which has resulted in the failure of the Special Operations Joint Intelligence 
section to fully incorporate a systems based analysis into the intelligence cycle. 
2. Shortfalls 
a. Full Interagency Collaboration 
The IW JOC goes into detail about the importance of unified action in an 
IW campaign.  “The JFC and military and IA planners must acknowledge and maintain 
balance across the campaign by continuously asking, ‘What will be the effect of this 
action or effort on the other lines of operation, the overall political-military campaign, 
and the strategic objectives?’”154  Unfortunately, SOCPAC has only succeed in getting 
the separate military echelons (USSOCOM, USPACOM, and JSOTF-P) to routinely ask 
this question.  Integration of the Country Team and other interagency (IA) partners was 
only accomplished at the tactical level.  The Republic of the Philippines U.S. Country 
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Team is not part of the effects-based process except when queried for assessment 
information.  The result is a “disconnect” in the unified effort needed for a holistic 
application of the all instruments of national power.   SOCPAC alone cannot overcome 
this shortfall.  Without a national effort within the USG to evolve IA capabilities, 
SOCPAC will have to maintain its piecemealed approach to a unified effort.   
b. SOCPAC Bureaucracy and Effects-based Thinking 
SOCPAC is a hybrid of the “procedural”, “craft”, and “coping” 
organizations described by James Q. Wilson in his book, Bureaucracy What Government 
Agencies Do And Why They Do It.155  The result is an organization that is near impossible 
to manage.  SOCPAC multiple mission requirements has caught it in a situation where 
the command can at times easily observe the activities and outcomes (exercise execution) 
and at other times are left with outputs and activities (Information Operations (IO)) that 
cannot be observed and are difficult to measure.  The bipolar nature of the command has 
left the staff with the difficult decision of defining core tasks that match the dynamic 
nature of the organization.  In a perfect world the commander and staff would understand 
the importance of carefully defining core tasks of the organization and to find both 
pecuniary and no pecuniary incentives that will induce operators to perform those tasks 
as defined.156 Prior to implementing an EBA, SOCPAC’s management system was 
primarily a “coping” organization using a “procedural” approach.  Now the command is 
becoming more “craft-like” organization as it tailors its approach to each unique task. 
SOCPAC adopted this new staff thinking process in order to balance its 
approach to the GWOT.  One of the primary issues with SOCPAC’s EBA staff thinking 
process is that it has evolved faster than the current organizational design.  This resulted 
in forcing the staff into compliance through the implementation of “matrix-like” planning 
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cells and boards.  A secondary result has been staff resistance to “owning” the process.  
This is compounded by the administrative “turn-over” common to most joint commands. 
The result is the required longevity and experience needed to manage an EBA. 
c. Staff Resistance 
One former SOCPAC operations officer stated, “Unfortunately, SOCPAC 
staff still struggles with ownership of this process and investing time into the 
development of long-range solutions.  This process pushes you to think long-range but 
that requires time and people which is challenging in a joint environment.”157  Another 
officer described the relevance of the new system simply as “a way of articulating what 
was being accomplished in a more formalized way in the RP [Republic of the 
Philippines].”158 Initially the general consensus was that attempting to create an 
Operational Net Assessment (ONA) that provided near perfect data on effects (that 
included the enemy and non-combatants and links social and physical infrastructure) at 
any given time was a bridge to far.  Setting up an effects cell within the command was 
one thing, reliance on an EBA process would only result in a slowing of the decision-
making process while a commander and staff awaited the ONA output.159  As James 
Wilson points out bureaucracies, like SOCPAC, work against an EBA process because it 
redefines the tasks required.  It was incredibly difficult to force staff members outside 
their comfort zones and take ownership of the process. 
Despite the initial resistance, the SOCPAC staff did slowly take 
ownership.  This was largely accomplished by the SOCPAC commander’s personal 
desires.  However, without an increase in knowledge and quantifiable benefits to learning 
this new way of thinking remains a piece meal process.  The model has yet to prove that 
SOCPAC can effectively integrate this system into a larger interagency approach.  This 
has left many staff officers on their own to access effects beyond what is directly 
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impacted by U.S. or host nation militaries.  Thus the system relies on subjective 
assessment of effects, often times not supported by any evidence from interagency 
partners.160  Without a common lexicon, training, and inclusion of other governmental 
agencies and host nation partners, it is only through the loose professional and personal 
relationships that they assessment piece truly works.  
d.  Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
(JIPOE) 
The Effects Cell and ONA cell are providing framework for which the 
command could expand its efforts, however the Special Operations Joint Intelligence 
section (SOJ2) has not incorporated a deliberate SoSA into its everyday JIPOE.  One of 
SOCPAC’s senior ONA analyst stated, “that the SOJ2s JIPOE staff process has not fully 
incorporated the work of the ONA and Effects Cells.”161 This shortcoming is indicative 
of the greater problems SOCPAC is having with the entire staff taking ownership of the 
process.  The “matrix-like” cells and commander’s directives have served as a quick fix.  
However, full indoctrination of the EBA process in daily staff activities has not been 
accomplished.  The shortcomings of in JIPOE to blend EBA full time point to the 
problems that the process has evolved faster than the bureaucracy. 
C. SUMMARY 
Despite the shortcomings of SOCPAC’s effects-based approach to a more indirect 
campaign, it has proven itself as example of how to operationalize the central concept of 
the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept.  Over two years prior to the IW JOC 
publication, SOCPAC was employing a more indirect approach in order to influence 
relevant populations in the Pacific theater’s war on terror.  SOCPAC identified early on 
in its own paradigm shift that the current staff construct and doctrinal processes did not 
fit the irregular operational environment that dominates the WOT.  SOCPAC needed a 
way to move beyond the linear thinking of traditional major combat operations and find a 
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way to define the complexity of an OE that include all instruments of national power 
working in concert to positively effect integrated subsystems of the nation-state system, 
while at the same time negatively effecting the centers of gravity of the terrorists 
networks in the Pacific theater.  By adopting an effect-based approach to operations 
SOCPAC enabled the staff to identify those key COGs and leverage its limited resources 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A. FILLING THE GAP WITH EBA 
As the SOCPAC model has shown, an effects-based approach facilitates the use 
of a top down systems approach to defining the current irregular warfare environment in 
the Pacific theater.  SOCPAC’s model has also moved towards developing the holistic 
solution for balancing both direct and indirect approaches to warfighting.   What 
SOCPAC has shown in the past two years is the potential for an effects-based approach 
to cover the needs for critical campaign planning, preparation, execution, assessment, 
force development, and force management capabilities in the greater GWOT.  An effects-
based approach to irregular warfare supported by the evolving technology that speed and 
amplify a systems based analysis of the operational environment could be the future of 
campaign planning.  The rise and popularity of “small wars” in a more irregular 
environment, where the end game is population control rather than control of territory, 
has brought the military and political leader back together.  No longer can the joint force 
commander simply ignore the other instruments of national power when security, 
stability, and peace do not equate to annihilation of an adversary’s forces.  Adding an 
effects-based approach to the current JOPES is necessary at the theater strategic and 
operational levels, specifically during the planning, execution, and assessment of an 
operation.162  It provides the JFC and his staff with the potential tools to “operationalize” 
the concepts presented in the IW JOC, in order to achieve strategic and operational 
effects in the GWOT.  
However, the shortfalls identified in the analysis of the SOCPAC model expose 
the need for additional changes beyond the adoption of just an effect-based approach.  
The lack of interagency inclusion and staff resistance may require greater fundamental 
changes to how the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Unites States government 
(USG) as a whole are approaching the GWOT.  Further study is required that goes 
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beyond the understanding of “jointness” and builds on how the concepts of irregular 
warfare and effects-based thinking can be applied to broader unified action.  Throughout 
the research and development of this thesis it has become clear that an effects-based 
approach can potentially fill the planning, execution, and assessment gap in the IW JOC.  
However, the process is not enough in and of itself.  What is needed is further research on 
the organizational structure required to execute a holistic DIME strategy in an irregular 
warfare campaign.  SOCPAC’s is an example of the potential of implementing an effects-
based approach as starting point for development of that doctrine. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If SOCPAC’s model is to become more broadly applied several institutional 
issues must be addressed within DoD prior to application to the GWOT.    The U.S. 
military must work to evolve its organizational design to support the successful conduct 
of irregular warfare at the same level achieved in the conventional realm.  EBA as a staff 
thinking tool needs to be incorporated doctrinally, just like the existing joint planning and 
execution systems. USSOCOM as the lead in implementation of the Irregular Warfare 
Joint Operating Concept, needs to further analyze the SOCPAC model and push the other 
TSOCs to develop their own Effects Coordination Cells that are tailored to each theaters 
WOT requirements.  USSOCOM can leverage its role as the lead for the USG in the 
GWOT to modify the staff bureaucracies in order to incorporate these doctrinal changes.  
However, in order to prevent the same shortfalls that SOCPAC has encountered 
additional doctrinal and training requirements must be addressed. 
First, the process and products used in an effects-based approach must be 
incorporated into service staff operating doctrine.  The current JOPES must be updated to 
included effects-based planning products.  This will expose the joint force commander 
and his staff to the various processes and products outlined in the Commander’s 
Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Operations.  Furthermore it will inform the 
staff where an EBA fits within the current joint doctrine.    
Second, effects-based thinking needs to be incorporated earlier in the training and 
development cycles of the U.S. military’s junior officer and non-commissioned officer 
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corps.  Each service must reflect the changes needed in the development of those officers 
and non-commissioned officers that will be the future of the joint force.  The concepts 
behind irregular warfare and effects-based thinking must be ingrained into the future joint 
force and become second like the current military decision making process (MDMP). 
Third, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government must develop a 
common interagency lexicon to guide current and future IW JOC.  Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld explored correcting this problem with a “Goldwater-Nicholas II” 
concept.   This was an effort to initiate the same type of revolutionary change that 
occurred in the Department of Defense under the original Goldwater-Nichols Act, only 
on a broader scale.  Secretary Rumsfeld hoped to change the concept and understanding 
of the inner workings of the U.S. governmental interagency system, much like 
Goldwater-Nicholas changed the way DoD understood the “joint” operations. 
Fourth, the Joint Manning Document (JMD) authorizations need to be updated to 
reflect the specialized skills needed to establish effects coordination cells and irregular 
warfare specialist.   The bureaucracy survives on the authorizations and money that 
support current manning requirements.  Without, these changes USSOCOM and the 
COCOMs will have to pull positions in an “ad hoc” manner and that only works counter 
to building the needed skills and longevity to be effective in the protracted nature of the 
GWOT. 
Fifth, as the lead planner, USSOCOM should not dictate a “playbook” for conduct 
of IW.  The very complex nature of IW does not lend itself to set plays.  Rather 
USSOCOM needs to further research the development of an adaptive system that 
provides predictive and measurable assessment.  An effects-based approach will 
potentially allow each JFC and his staff to determine the most appropriate ways and 
means to execute an IW campaign in their theater or area of responsibility.   
Finally, further research is required to analyze the capability of the DoD and the 




not a single person, agency, or department within the USG charged with the responsible 
for planning, coordinating, resourcing, executing, and controlling all elements of national 
power within the National Security Apparatus for IW.   
C. FINAL THOUGHT 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s second maxim of war states, 
In planning a campaign, it is necessary to anticipate the enemy’s actions, 
and then to prepare the means to thwart them.  Plans of a campaign may 
be modified, ad ifintium, according to circumstances – the genius of the 
general, the character of the troops, and the terrain of the theater of 
action.163 
This maxim will always hold true despite a conventional or irregular “theater of action.”  
However, understanding how to plan a campaign that “anticipates”, “thwarts”, and is still 
flexible enough to be “modified, ad infinitum, according to circumstance” has change 
over the centuries.  No longer can the general simple rely on his staff to translate his 
strategic vision into the tactical destruction of a belligerent’s forces.  Today the staff 
needs a tool that goes beyond the current joint operating systems in be effective in 
winning in the irregular environment.  By coupling an effects-based approach with the 
current joint staff process, USSOCOM can start the process of operationalizing the 
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept and give current and future joint force 
commander’s the way and means to complement their strategic vision in prosecuting an 
irregular fight. 
                                                 
163 D’Aguilar, G.C., trans. and William Lidwell, ed., Napoleon’s Military Maxims (WOWIO Books, 
2006) http://www.wowio.com/users/product.asp?BookId=11, (accessed 3 July 2007), 1. 
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